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Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is a crucial stage in the process of acquiring a new system for the 
DoD. AoA is essentially a multi-criteria decision process that involves several stakeholders. An 
AoA is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, cost, and risks of proposed 
materiel solutions to gaps and shortfalls in operational capability.  Two of the three criteria – 
effectiveness (what can the system do and how its capabilities fit the operational requirements) 
and comparative costs of potentially viable solutions draw the most attention in such studies.  
The third set, risks, which typically draws somewhat less attention in an AoA than the other two, 
is concerned with the technical, operational, and programmatic implications for each alternative.  
More precisely, we describe operational risks as the long-term readiness, sustainment, and 
logistics requirements for the specified alternative. In this paper we study in detail the content of 
this set of criteria, focusing on the factors that affect the long-term viability and usefulness of an 
alternative, and propose Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as the analytic framework for 
















The Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition System comprises three interconnected stages 
that start with specifying requirements – a procedure called Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS). The second stage, called Acquisition Process, determines 
appropriate materiel solutions for the requirements. The third stage is concerned with funding 
and financial-controlling activities contained in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
Execution (PPBE) process. Most of the decisions that have long-term sustainment, readiness and 
logistics implications are taken at the second stage, where materiel choices are made. The 
overarching process dominating this stage is the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) that, in general, 
trades off the effectiveness of a materiel solution with its risks and costs. DoD Instructions 
5000.02, which provides policy guidelines and regulations for managing the acquisition system, 
states that “The AoA assesses potential materiel solutions that could satisfy validated capability 
requirement(s) documented in the Initial Capabilities Document, and supports a decision on the 
most cost effective solution to meeting the validated capability requirement(s). In developing 
feasible alternatives, the AoA will identify a wide range of solutions that have a reasonable 
likelihood of providing the needed capability” (DoD, 2020). In general, the instructions are 
pushing for the AoA to be conducted earlier in the acquisition process. 
The AoA is essentially a large-scale multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) problem that 
involves multiple stakeholders and many uncertainties (Kress & Morgan, 2018). The set of 
criteria used in evaluating alternatives, and their weights or importance, depend, among others, 
on the technological maturity of the alternatives. For example, the risk associated with acquiring 
an off-the-shelf system may in some cases be considerably lower than the risk in developing a 
new system but in other cases using such components which were designed for other purposes 
may actually add risks to the new system. Thus, the “risk” criterion, with all its derivatives, is 
less prominent for the former than the latter. In this study we focus on systems that are still in 
various stages of development, which means that the AoA process is typically not a “one-shot” 
decision event but rather a sequence of decisions marked by achievements. In these settings, the 
AoA starts off with a set of potential alternatives being developed as prototypes. As time passes, 
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more data is collected and this enables analysts to revisit earlier analysis outcomes with better 
insights. Prior to making decisions that commit the resources needed for development leading 
eventually to production and fielding, analysts solve additional MCDA problems to inform 
decision-makers on which specific product or design concepts will be pursued, and whether 
resources will be committed to mature technology and/or mitigate any risks in research and 
development.  The process culminates in a preferred alternative. 
Several MCDA methods have been proposed in the literature as the platform for AoA studies.  
Many of those methods belong to the "compensatory" family of parametric methods based on the 
ability of the analysts to determine values of alternatives and weights (importance) of criteria, 
leading to a weighted average score of each alternative.  An interesting application of these 
classical methods in the context of realigning US Army bases is given in (Ewing, Tarantino, & 
Parnell, 2006). This family of parametric compensatory methods is very broad and includes 
models with a wide variety of features and properties. A notable example of this family of 
methods is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), where values and weights are determined via 
pairwise comparisons, see (Saaty, 2008).  However, AHP, with its specific features associated 
with eigenvalues, was highly criticized as several of its basic concepts lie on shaky mathematical 
foundations, e.g., see (Barzilai & Golany, 1994).  
Outranking is another family of MCDA methods.  A representative method in this family is 
Elimination and Choice Expressing Reality (ELECTRE) where alternatives are gradually 
discarded on the basis of outranking rules (Roy, 1968). However, ELCTRE, and other similar 
methods, were criticized for their use of arbitrary rules and veto thresholds.          
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a new paradigm, grounded on the well-established 
theory of Data Envelopment Analysis (Charnes, et al., 1978) for studying and promoting 
awareness to logistic considerations, readiness implications and total ownership cost during the 
acquisition process while applying suitable quantitative tools to handle uncertainties involved in 
some of the parameters.  The unique feature of DEA, which stands out compared to other MCDA 
models, is that it is a non-parametric method. DEA avoids the pitfalls of previous methods 
mentioned above by letting the method choose an individual set of weights for each alternative 
through solving a series of linear programming problems, one for each alternative.  DEA 
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evaluates the "efficiency" of an alternative, compared to others, in the most equitable way and 
thus enables decision makers to focus on the most efficient alternatives for in-depth analysis.   
2. Readiness, Sustainment, and Logistics 
The DoD Dictionary (DoD, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2019) defines 
sustainment as the provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and 
prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (JP 3-0). Readiness is defined as 
the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions. (JP 1). Logistics 
is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. (JP 4-0). Notice that the term 
logistics is included in the definition of sustainment. Thus, henceforth we will focus on the two 
factors: readiness and sustainment. 
Sustainment and readiness are terms that typically apply to the entire military force. They are 
considered two of the “four pillars” of military capability (Moore, Stockfisch, Goldberg, & 
Holroyd, 1991). Measures of sustainment and readiness describe features such as resources 
availability, level of training and percentage of platforms that are mission-ready at any time 
(Rich, Cohen, & Pyles, 1987). 
In this study we consider these terms in a more restricted way; as they reflect the virtues and 
shortcomings of acquisition alternatives.   
In the context of Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), see, e.g., (HAF, 2016), the relative value of a 
certain (new) acquisition alternative (compared to other alternatives) is based on three 
dimensions, each a combination of several criteria: (a) effectiveness during operations, (b) cost, 
and (c) readiness & sustainment (R&S) attributes.  The R&S dimension accounts for all the 
factors not directly related to the first two, such as risks, dependencies on other systems and 
peripheral requirements. The three dimensions are not orthogonal. For example, sustainment 
involves (lifecycle) cost considerations, and effectiveness is affected by readiness.  
Effectiveness of an alternative is measured through the gaps, if they exist, between the 
performances of each alternative and the operational requirements that were set during the 
JCIDS.  Lifecycle cost (sometimes referred to as total ownership cost) is measured by 
accumulating the various expected costs directly associated with each alternative.  Both 
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dimensions have been studied in depth and there exist proven methodologies that address them in 
AoA studies (e.g., combat simulations and cost estimation methods).  In this paper, we focus on 
the third dimension, R&S, which, we believe, demands as much attention as the other two 
dimensions. Failing to devote this attention, especially during the early stages of the AoA, may 
potentially lead to choosing an alternative that is most cost-effective from the point of view of 
the first two dimensions, but may become, economically burdensome and eventually even 
impossible to operate in the long run.  
We next review some articles that highlight challenges in identifying the components of 
readiness and sustainability, and the complexities in analyzing them. 
2.1  Challenges in evaluating readiness and sustainability 
Several important issues related to the evaluation of readiness and sustainability in military 
context have been studied in recent years. (Canician & Daniels, 2018) emphasize the trade-offs 
in the "iron triangle" of readiness, modernization and force structure that military services must 
consider when making procurement decisions.  They argue that equating readiness with “military 
capability” obscures the critical elements of training/maintenance/equipment and personnel fill in 
readiness.  In our paper, we indeed adopt a holistic approach that includes all these elements in 
the procedures we suggest for measuring readiness.  They further argue that the standard DoD 
measurement procedure of readiness, known as Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), is 
inadequate as it focuses only on inputs and doesn't account for outputs.  Again, our proposed 
model considers simultaneously inputs and outputs.  
(Harrison, 2014) highlights the differences in the definition of readiness at the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels.  He discusses the components that define readiness and 
emphasize, as we do, that understanding how best to resource readiness requires better metrics 
and a better understanding of the relationships between inputs (resources) and outputs 
(readiness). 
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG, 2019) revision views sustainment as a distributed 
and long-term activity that requires the alignment of multiple and disparate stakeholders. It 
emphasizes the need to carry out sustainment planning from the earliest stages of the system's 
life cycle.   
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(Robbins, Broyles, Giradini, Abel, & Boren, 2019) describe the longstanding shortfall in the 
Weapon System Support Program (WSSP) performance. They state that a primary reason for the 
shortfall is the failure to use tools and methodologies for accurately determining true critical 
weapon system readiness drivers and differentiating these items from others. Our paper 
addresses exactly this issue by identifying and analyzing the readiness drivers.    
(Doheney, Gray, McLemore, & Savage, 2019) argue that the U.S. military currently uses 
“readiness reports” to communicate the cumulative effects of details on its "big things". 
However, the word “readiness,” like the word “risk,” is inconsistently defined and discussions 
and planning around this topic are often ambiguous.  They claim that standard representations of 
uncertainty now make it possible to roll up analytical models into larger models and call the 
services to embrace such representations and further develop them in the context of readiness 
accounting. These advancements could move military decision-makers from ambiguous 
estimates of “ready or not?” to unambiguously calculating, quantifying and communicating “how 
ready for what?”.  Our paper uses standard probability measures to assess risk and uncertainty 
and embed these estimates in a larger model that quantifies the degrees of readiness and 
sustainability.  
Next, we describe the content of the R&S dimension and discuss its criticality. 
2.2 Readiness 
Readiness of an acquisition system has three different aspects: technological, technical and 
functional. While technological readiness describes the state of a system still being developed 
and the projected time of completing its production and testing, technical and functional 
readiness relate to the actual operation of the system when it is fully operational and already 
deployed.   
2.2.1 Technological Readiness 
The technological aspect of readiness describes the maturity of the technology, and the 
production and testing capabilities needed for the newly developed system. As mentioned above, 
this type of readiness only applies to the development phase of the system; it describes how close 
the system is to becoming fully operational. Analysts have used several scales to evaluate this 
aspect. Back in the 1980’s the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
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introduced the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) as a tool to assess the maturity of particular 
technologies which it planned to embed in new systems. The TRL is a nine-level scale that 
ranges from “Basic Principles Observed and Reported” (Level 1) to “Actual System Proven 
through Successful Mission Operations” (Level 9).  According to the Department of Defense 
(DoD), a weapon system program cannot include a technology whose TRL is lower than level 7 
(GAO, 1999). (Sauser, et al., 2008) combine the TRL, which is purely technology-oriented, with 
a system-integration measure – the Integration/Interface Readiness Level (IRL) – and produce 
the System Readiness Level (SRL), which is a more holistic engineering measure for the 
technological maturity of a system. (Atwater & Uzdzinski, 2014) generalized the SRL into a 
“wholistic” view of system maturity that includes also functionality (i.e. man-machine interface). 
Technological readiness is tied to the risk criteria in the AoA process. The risks associated with 
an alternative that is still in technological development stages reflect the uncertainties regarding 
the feasibility that the alternative will be mission-ready on time and within budget. Thus, during 
the AoA and the subsequent development and production phases, the technological readiness of a 
system can be defined by a value proportional to the assessed probability that the system will be 
completed on time and within budget.  
As mentioned above, the technological readiness of a system has to do with projecting the 
completion time of the underlying research, development and production project, and the total 
cost of the system. The SRL, data from similar past projects, and most of all, inputs from subject 
matter experts are used to obtain the relative technological readiness values of the alternatives, 
using techniques similar to the one described in (Kress & Morgan, 2018).  
Finally, note that technological readiness changes dynamically during the acquisition process. It 
is updated periodically as the project advances; the closer is the project to completion, the more 
accurate is the estimate of this type of readiness.  
 
2.2.2 Technical Readiness   
A system is technically ready if all its components are in a perfect working condition. Thus, 
technical readiness (TR) has to do with the reliability and maintainability of the system and its 
components. TR can be measured by the probability that the system is technically mission-ready 
at any point in time during its life cycle. TR is closely tied with sustainment, which is discussed 
later on.  TR is also related to the nature of the missions planned for the system and particularly 
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to the typical alert time the forces are expected to have before launching a mission.  For example, 
missile interception systems are expected to become ready within seconds of an alert while 
submarine missions will typically have alert times of days or even weeks.      
 
Three main factors determine the TR of a system: (a) reliability, which is measured by the mean 
time between failures (MTBF), (b) the effort needed to fix the system, which is measured by the 
average service time, and (c) the availability of spare-parts needed for its maintenance and repair. 
Note that factor (b) depends to large extent on factor (c); availability, or lack thereof, of repair-
parts affect the total service time of a system. 
In principle, factor (a) – MTBF – is measurable; the MTBF of each component in the system, 
along with the associated reliability-graph of the system, can project the system-wide MTBF. 
The problem is that the MTBF figures for the various components are only estimates, based on 
limited data and simulations. The actual MTBF of the system cannot be robustly estimated until 
the system is fully operational for some time and enough failure data is collected. Similarly, to 
factor (a), the impact of factor (b) – service time – is practically unknown until the system is 
operational for some time and enough service-time data are collected. The fact that data 
regarding the first two factors are unavailable at the time when the AoA is initiated does not 
mean that they should be ignored. Technical details, comparisons with similar systems, 
meticulously designed simulations, and early testing of critical components should be utilized for 
evaluating these two important factors of technical readiness. The third factor is the availability 
of repair parts, which is affected by the number, complexity, variability, and cost of the system’s 
components, as well as by the robustness of the supply chain that provides the repair-parts. These 
characteristics could be evaluated well in advance and factored in quite smoothly into the 
evaluation of technical readiness. For example, the lead time for delivering a certain repair part, a 
parameter that could be estimated from the features of its supply chain, will be used to estimate 
total repair time. The impact of unavailable repair parts is determined by design factors such as 
redundancy of sub-systems and components. The modularity of subsystems affects the repair 
time (factor (b)). “Plug-and-Play”–type components obviously need less service time than 
components that require installing, reconfiguration and adjustments.  
It is quite unlikely to have a reliable TR measure during the early phases of the AoA process. 
There will not be enough data to support it. However, as the system advances in its development 
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process, more knowledge and experience are accumulated, and the TR measure – combining 
MTBF, service time and repair-parts lead time – gets updated accordingly. We discuss the 
specific features of a possible TR measures later on. 
     
2.2.3 Functional Readiness   
A system which is fully developed and technically ready for operations is not necessarily that 
fully operational. For a system to function effectively, one may need to ensure the functionality 
of other, supporting or peripheral, systems. Full functionality will also require that certain types 
of operators will be available to run it, and specific elements of infrastructure will be in place to 
support it. First, a system, as advanced and sophisticated as it may be, needs people to operate, 
control, maintain and utilize its outputs. These operators, controllers, support personnel and users 
need to be trained and available for their respective tasks. Shortage in any of the required 
manpower capabilities and expertise needed for the system may render the system 
nonoperational. Arguably, the impact of unavailable personnel varies among the tasks. A system 
that needs four operators during a shift may be operational, albeit less effectively, with just three 
operators. But, a repair technician who is not available when the system is down can be 
detrimental. A system may also need peripheral support such as protected environment, robust 
supply chain of resources, and access to communication networks. It may also depend on the 
operations of other systems, where failure in one or more of them may render our system 
nonoperational even if all other technical and functional factors are in perfect condition. 
As mentioned above, we note the difference between the first type of readiness – technological 
readiness – and the other two. While the first type applies to the development/production stage of 
the alternative, the last two refer to the readiness of the system once it is deployable and ready 
for operation. In the following, when we refer to “readiness” as operational readiness, we 
restrict the definition to only the technical and functional aspects. The technological aspect does 
not apply to operational readiness and therefore should be treated separately.   
Both technical and functional readiness can be further broken down into a vector of sub-factors 
that define it in greater granularity.  Combining all these factors and sub-factors into a single 
operational readiness measure will require some weighting methods – a topic that will be 





In a nutshell, following acquisition, total ownership cost is the cost of sustainment – the cost of 
maintaining a system in an adequate operational condition. Technical and functional readiness 
are contingent on sustainment. Sustainment encompasses all the materiel and services needed for 
the effective and prolonged operation of a system so that it satisfies the missions for which it is 
designed.  There are three facets to sustainment: supplies, facilities and personnel. Each facet 
requires efforts and resources in order to be an effective enabler of sustainment. 
 
2.3.1 Supplies 
Vehicles need fuel and repair parts, weapons need ammunition, source of energy, and repair 
parts, and operators of systems need food, water and other personal supplies. Systems with low 
TR score may require extra supplies for to handle more frequent repairs.  The quantity and 
diversity of the supply items needed to operate the system affect the economic burden on 
sustaining the system, and the availability of these resources affects the operational readiness of 
the system. Other supply-related factors that affect the economic burden are transportation and 
storage costs of these supply items. The responsiveness and reliability of the supply chain affect 
availability of supplies and thus the operational readiness. 
 
2.3.2 Facilities 
Defense systems need storage, maintenance and support facilities. Advanced weapons and C2 
systems may require also expensive training and simulation facilities. Systems with low TR 
score may require more extensive maintenance facilities as compared to systems with high TR 
scores.  The size, quality and fitness of a facility will affect the readiness of the system that relies 
on them. For example, if a certain system requires certain environmental conditions, say, low 
temperature, for operating properly, then the quality and reliability of the air-condition 
capabilities in the facility are crucial for making the system mission ready. 
 
2.3.3 Personnel 
All systems, as advanced as they may be, need humans to operate, control and maintain them. 
Personnel with a variety of skills and trainings need to be available for those tasks. If, for 
example, a system requires a 24/7 human controller, then sustaining proper readiness will entail 
12 
 
at least three qualified personnel, operating in 8 hours shifts, in order to keep the system mission 
ready.  
 
3. R&S Factors 
Based on the discussion in Section 2, we identify the following main factors that affect the R&S 
dimension: 
 Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). This is one of the most significant factors 
affecting technical readiness. The complexity of the system, and the reliability of each of 
its components determine the failure rate of the system – the probability the system is 
technical fit at any given moment. Arguably, this parameter depends on the alternative’s 
regular service and preventive maintenance schedule. This schedule, measured by the 
Mean Time Between Service (MTBS – see below), is inversely related to the MTBF; 
smaller MTBS will increase the MTBF of the system and thus enhance technical 
readiness, at an increased cost rate. 
 Mean Time Between Services (MTBS). Each alternative system comes with 
instructions concerning regular service schedule and preventive maintenance actions. 
MTBS is measured by the frequency of such actions, as specified by the manufacturer.  
 Repair Time & Service Time. The system is down while it is in (scheduled) service or 
(unscheduled) repair following a failure. Obviously, during those down times the system 
is inoperable. The length of a down time depends on the complexity of the system and the 
availability of resources – personnel, facilities, tools and spare-parts. For example, a 
modular system that facilitates “plug & play”-type repair technique would require less 
repair effort and therefore experience less down time than a non-modular system. Note 
that repair and service are actions that only apply to technical readiness, as defined 
earlier. 
 Repair Cost & Service Cost. These are the costs for maintaining the system technically 
ready. These costs include spare-parts, tools, infrastructure and personnel. These costs 
can be reasonably estimated from analyzing the components of the system and from the 
manufacturer’s specifications regarding service and preventive maintenance. A possible 
service cost is derived from designated up-time. Certain systems require frequent uptime 
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to maintain their lifetime expectancy while others can stay dormant for longer times.  The 
larger the uptime requirement is the more difficult it is to sustain the system. 
 Setup Time and Cost. A system may be, by design, in a “cold” operational stand-by 
condition (e.g., a system that is only activated in an emergency). The setup time and cost 
that brings the system into a fully operational state is a crucial aspect in measuring 
readiness (time) and sustainment (cost). 
 Interdependency. Dependency on other systems makes an alternative more vulnerable to 
failure and potentially more disruptive when failed than an alternative, which operates as 
stand-alone. Examples: 
o A vehicle that needs to be transported by other means of transportation to the area 
of deployment.  
o A moving platform (aerial, ground or sea) that depends on satellites availability 
for its navigation.   
o A system that requires extensive and expensive training facility to become 
operational. 
o A sensor, which is connected to an elaborate command and control system. 
 Personnel. Any system requires operators, controllers and technicians. Finding qualified 
and skilled personnel, training them and then retaining them is always challenging. 
Ceteris paribus, a simpler alternative to operate and maintain, which requires a few, 
easily trained, operators and technicians is preferred to a more complex alternative, which 
requires highly skilled and trained personnel. 
 Supply Chain. The availability of spare-parts that facilitate technical readiness depends 
on an efficient and robust supply chain. Supply chain is also one of the principal means 
for making a system functionally ready. A vehicle needs fuel, a sensor requires electrical 
power and a weapon will not operate without ammunition. The type of supplies (size, 
weight, scarcity, fragility, handling requirements), and the frequency at which they are 
needed, affect the cost of sustainment, and the length and robustness of the supply chain. 
Part of the supply chain is the logistic tail of the deployable system – certain systems 
require a large, expensive or difficult to maintain tail in order to ensure their functionality 
(e.g., a convoy of supply trucks) while others require little or even negligible tails 
(sometime referred to as "deploy & forget" systems).  Obviously, larger logistic tail 
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requirements imply more difficulties in sustaining a system. An alternative that requires 
more frequent deliveries of expensive supplies by a more fragile supply chain is inferior 
to a more self-sustained alternative, which is supported by a simpler supply chain. There 
are several factors that determine the vulnerability of a supply chain – e.g., single source 
vs. multiple sources, geographical distances between the nodes in the chain, the required 
transportation means, their availability, and their robustness to environmental conditions 
such as weather and terrain.  
We note that these factors are not necessarily independent. For example, the effect of the 
supply chain on the overall R&S rating of an alternative depends on the repair and service 
costs; lower demand for spare-parts makes a supply chain less crucial for the sustainment of 
the alternative. To avoid dealing with such dependencies, we will define measures for “meta-
factors”, which combine similar factors into (relative) measures.  
 
4.  Measuring the R&S Factors 
Recall that this study is concerned with the R&S dimension in the context of AoA where 
relative evaluations – rather than absolute ones – are sufficient. This observation is important 
because many of the aforementioned factors, and the meta-factors defined below, are not 
easily measurable. This phenomenon is rather common in MCDA problems and analysts 
apply value or utility functions to combine such measures.  For example, one may apply 
ordinal preferences, such as Likert scale (Allen & Seaman, 2007), and combine them, in 
some consistent way, with measurable factors to produce an overall ranking of the 
alternatives with respect to the R&S dimension. 
Next, we describe measures for evaluating the various facets of the R&S dimension. 
 
4.1 Mean Time Between Downs (MTBD) 
The MTBD is a combination of the MTBF and the MTBS (see definitions above). The mean 
time between failure of a system can be statistically estimated only after it has been in 
operation for some time and enough failure data has been collected. This is obviously not the 
case in an AoA setting where the alternatives are still in a development stage. One possible 
way to assess the MTBF is by considering the way the components relate to each other in the 
system (i.e., in parallel or in series) and evaluating separately the reliability of each 
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component, assuming such data is available. Integrating all this information, say, in a 
simulation, can produce a reasonable estimate for the MTBF. The MTBS is derived from the 
manufacturer recommended service and preventive maintenance schedule. This parameter 
should be given as part of the specification of the system. If ST  is the (deterministic) MTBS, 
and the failure process follows an exponential distribution with mean 
1
F
(which may or may 







S FMTBD T e t e dt
     . 
 
4.2 Mean Down Time (MDT) 
The system is down while in (unscheduled) repair or (scheduled) service. If the mean repair 
time and the mean service time are F  and S , respectively, then, assuming exponential 
distribution,  the MDT is given by (1 )F S F ST TF SMDT e e
      . Note that while S can be 
directly estimated from the service and preventive maintenance specifications,  F  is more 
elusive and may be estimated from simulation, similarly to the MTBF. Also note that the 
computation of both MTBD and MDT are easily generalized when the failure distribution is 
general, not necessarily exponential. Specifically, if the failure distribution has the CDF 
( )FF t  , and the down states generate a renewal process, then the MTBD and the MDT are 
0
(1 ( )) ( )
ST
S F S FT F T tdF t    and ( ) (1 ( ))F F S S F SF T F T   , respectively. 
4.3 Maintenance Cost (MC) 
MC is truly a meta-factor encompassing all the resources needed to maintain the system in 
operational state. These expenditures include fix costs, denoted FMC, such as infrastructure 
(e.g., shops, storage facilities, labs, equipment, personnel) and variable cost covering 
replaceable parts, energy and other resources needed for a specific maintenance mission. 
Standard practices of cost estimation (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015) may be used to obtain 
estimates for the two types of cost. If the average variable maintenance cost per maintenance 







  Ignoring, for simplicity discount rates, and assuming a reference time 






   
4.4 Operational Cost (OC) 
Operational cost is relatively simple to compute because it relates to a fixed set of actions 
that need to be executed by the system. Such a set is typically well defined as it establishes 
the foundation for functional readiness (see Section 2.1.3). The operational cost is the cost of 
daily, or recurrent, operations. It can be measured by the number of operators and controllers, 
broken down by required skills, cost of operating facility (when applicable) and the amount 
and type of energy needed for the operation. If the functional characteristics of the system to 
be selected is such that it is dormant most of the time and is activated only when needed, then 
the operational cost includes also the set-up cost and time required for activation. An 
alternative that can become active faster and at lower cost has lower operational cost than an 
alternative that takes time to set up. The parameter measuring OC is the average daily cost of 
operations. 
 
4.5 Interdependency (INT) 
The more a system depends on other systems and processes, the more it is vulnerable to 
possible breakdowns and failures of those peripheral systems and processes. Thus, such 
dependency leads to lower functional reliability. To capture this vulnerability, we first define, 
for each alternative, the set of peripheral systems and processes upon which it depends. We 
call it the Systems' Dependency Set. Arguably, ceteris paribus, the larger the dependency set 
the lower the functional reliability of the alternative because more things can go wrong. In 
particular, if an alternative is a fully stand-alone system, then interdependency has no effect.  
We describe the state of the dependency set by a k-dimensional {0,1} vector x, where k is the 
cardinality of that set. If a system in the dependency set is up and running its corresponding 
entry in the vector is 1, otherwise that entry is 0. For example, if k = 3, then the vector x = 
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(1,0,1) indicates that the first and third peripheral systems in the dependency set of the 
alternative are up and running while the second system is down.  
The functional readiness of the alternative depends on the state vector of its associated 
dependency set. We denote that effect by the function ( )D x . For example, if the number of 
peripheral systems of an alternative is k = 3,  then (1,1,1) 1D   (no effect) and 
1 (1,1,1) (1,1, 0) (1,0,0) (0, 0,0) 0.D D D D     In other words, fewer functioning 
peripheral systems imply lower functional reliability of the alternative. In general, 
0 ( ) 1.D x   
Let , 1,...,ip i k  denote the probability that the i-th peripheral system in the dependency set 
of the alternative is operational and functioning. Assuming independence, which in many 
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The power set 2x  is the set of all possible realizations of the k-dimensional vector describing 
the state of the dependency set. We define the interdependency index of an alternative by  
2
( ) ( ).
xx
INT p x D x

   
The higher the value of INT the more robust is the alternative with respect to its dependency on 
other systems. 
4.6 Personnel (PER)  
The cost of personnel is accounted for in the operational cost (OC) discussed above. There is 
another aspect of personnel that affects the functional and technical reliability of an alternative – 
the dependence on certain types of qualified personnel. The more a system relies on a large 
variety of skilled personnel the more it is vulnerable to their possible absence. Thus, like the 
interdependency factor INT described above, such dependency may lead to lower functional and 
technical reliability. To capture the personnel vulnerability, we propose the same approach used 
for interdependency.  
18 
 
We define for each alternative the Personnel Dependency Set, which comprises the skill set of 
persons needed for the operation of the system. We describe the state of the dependency set by a 
k-dimensional vector x of natural numbers, where k is the number of skill-types (e.g., technicians 
of certain types, operators of different training levels, etc.) needed for operating and maintaining 
the system, and , 1,..., ,ix i k is the number of people of type i  available at any given time. Let 
, 1,..., ,is i k denote the number of people of type i  required by the system at any given time. As 
in the interdependency case, we define 1( ) ( ,..., ), ,k i iR x R x x x s   as the effectiveness of the 
system when the available personnel team is x. We have that 1( ) ( ,..., ) 1kR s R s s  and ( ) 1.R x   








   possible profiles of personnel availability. 
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S  
    
An alternative that is reasonably functional with less personnel will have a higher PER score 
than an alternative that is sensitive to staffing. 
For example suppose k = 3 (three different types of personnel) and 1 2 32, 1, 1.s s s    In other 
words, the system requires a team of four, say, two operators ( 1i  ), one controller ( 2i  ) and 
one technician ( 3i  ). We have 1 (2,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,0)R R R   , etc. The closer the PER of a 
system to 1 the smaller the effect of reduced staff. 
4.7 Supply Chain 
There are many factors that affect the robustness of a supply chain (SC) – e.g., single source vs. 
multiple sources of supply, geographical distances between the nodes in the chain, the type and 
availability of means of transportation, etc. The literature on SC has not reached a consensus on 
unified quantitative measures that can objectively assess the relative “value” of different SCs and 
hence we propose to use an ordinal scale where the alternatives in the AoA are simply ranked by 
subject matter experts in the AoA team. This is the only qualitative and subjective input into the 
R&S part of the AoA. We assume that subject matter experts can produce such a ranking that 
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may have ties for alternatives that are evaluated as having equally effective and robust supply 
chain. Thus, the higher the rank SC of an alternative, the more robust and effective is its supply 
chain. Note that a higher rank implies a smaller (integer) value of SC.  
5. Using DEA for Evaluating R&S 
In this section we offer a methodology to assess the R&S value of an alternative. Recall that our 
goal is to evaluate the relative value of an alternative with respect to the R&S factors, not its 
absolute value.  
Suppose, for simplicity, that the R&S dimension comprise only two factors:  MTBD and MC. 
Obviously we wish to have a reliable alternative with high MTBD and low maintenance cost 
MC. A reasonable relative measure for the alternative would be the “reliability/cost” ratio 
MTBD/MC. The higher this ratio, the better the alternative with respect to the R&S dimension. 
So, if the only R&S factors were MTBD and MC then we could easily rate the alternatives from 
best to worst. However, we have seven factors that affect this dimension. The challenge is how 
to extend the ratio idea described above with respect to MTBD and MC to all seven factors.  
To meet this challenge, we propose to use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology.  
Since it was first proposed in the late 1970s by (Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, Measuring the 
Efficiency of Decision Making Units, 1978), DEA has been applied to hundreds of application 
areas including several DoD-related applications such as evaluating the efficiency of air-force 
maintenance units (Charnes, Clark, Cooper, & Golany, 1984). Other relevant applications 
include (Bowlin, 1996), which describes how DEA can be used to address various DoD 
evaluation procedures; (Brockett, Golany, Rousseau, Thomas, & Zhou, 1997) that evaluates the 
efficiency of US Army recruitment units; (Han & Sohn, 2011) which evaluates the performance 
of Korean Air-Force bases; (Falagario, Sciancalepore, Constantino, & Pietroforte, 2012) propose 
DEA as fair, equal and transparent decision making tool aimed at helping an awarding 
committee in in selecting tenders that will meet governmental procurement regulations and 
requirements in accordance with European Union directives; (Sutton & Dinitrov, 2013) who use 
DEA to assign sailors to tasks for the US Navy; (Yang, Wang, Wang, & Ma, 2016) present the 
way DEA was adopted by the Taiwanese government as a method-of-choice to evaluate 
procurement alternatives; (Lu, Kweh, Nourani, & Shih, 2019) propose DEA to evaluate 
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alternatives in selecting major weapon in a cost‐effective manner and demonstrate it with an 
example of procuring fighter jets for the Singaporean government and (Boehmke, et al., 2017) 
that measures installation support activities in the US Air Force. 
Essentially, DEA is a non-parametric methodology for comparing multiple entities, all of which 
use the same set of inputs (albeit, in different quantities) to produce the set of outputs (again, 
with different quantities).  If  1, ..., mO O  denote a vector of outputs and 1, ..., nI I denotes a vector of 
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 . The question is what are the “right” weights 
1,..., mx x and 1,..., ny y .  
DEA evaluates the relative efficiency (i.e., determines the values of 1,..., mx x and 1,..., ny y ) of 
each alternative by solving a corresponding linear programming model that determines for the 
alternative the values of the aforementioned weights. The idea is to present each alternative in 
the best possible way while meeting some logical constraints.  Normalizing the value of the 
highest relative efficiency to 100%, a system that receives a score that is smaller than 100% (i.e., 
its associated model failed to find a set of weights that will present it as 100% efficient) is by 
definition inefficient and DEA can assess the gap between its current performance and the 
efficient frontier that the methodology construct on the basis of the entities that were found to be 
100% efficient.  DEA was specifically designed to handle situations such as the one we face here 
as it is capable of handling data that is not easily converted into universal quantitative measure 
such as dollar. In our case we have measures associated with time (MTBD, MDT), money (MC, 
OC) effectiveness (INT, PER), and an ordinal scale (SC).   
In our context, we distinguish between factors for which more is better – MTBD, INT, PER – 
and factors for which less is better – MDT, MC, OC and SC. Accordingly, we will consider the 
“efficiency” ratio  
.M I P
D M O S
x MTBD x INT x PER
ER







With the exception of the ordinal SC the standard DEA model will apply. The presence of the 
ordinal factor necessitates a modification of the standard DEA model, as described in (Cook, 
Kress, & Seiford, 1993). 
Note that the selection of factors – the input and output variables in this DEA framework – is not 
rigid; it may vary according to the specific type of acquisition. For example, vehicles and 
weapons will have a common set of core variables but each may have additional factors, which 
are specific to the system. 
 
6. The DEA Model 
Let n denote the number of alternatives to be evaluated with respect to the R&S dimension. The 
index , 1,..., ,i i n indicates the identity of an alternative. We solve n linear programming 
problems – one for each alternative. The data for the optimization model are the quantitative 
parameters , , , , , ,i i i i i iMTBD INT PER MDT MC OC and the qualitative ordinal parameter 
( ), 1,..., , 1,...,iSC k i n k l   where l is the number of rank positions, and  









The idea is as follows: each alternative, in its turn, is given the “opportunity” to select its 
coefficients such that it gets the highest possible efficiency ratio ER. It can do it as long as these 
“best” coefficients it selected, when applied to the efficiency ratio of any other alternative, does 
not exceed 1. Thus, the maximum possible efficiency ratio is ER = 1. Those alternatives, which 
reach 1, are considered R&S efficient. In addition to the normalization constraint that limits each 
efficiency ratio not to exceed 1, we require that all coefficients are non-negative and the weights 
of the ordinal parameter (SC) adhere to the rank positions, that is, a weight of rank 1 should be 
lower than the weight of rank 2, etc. 
For each alternative, temporarily assigned the index 0, we solve the following linear optimization 
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where  is an arbitrary separation parameter determined by the decision-maker. In the next 
section we illustrate this methodology on an example. 
7. Example 
At each milestone of the AoA more detailed and reliable information is gathered about the seven 
measures – MTBD, MDT, MC, OC, INT, PER and SC. The data is entered into the DEA model 
and the relative standings of the alternatives are obtained with respect to the R&S dimension. 
Suppose there are currently three alternatives under consideration, and the R&S measures are as 




















Alt1 33 0.7 0.7 3 18 5 I 
Alt2 30 0.6 0.7 3 16 2 II 
Alt3 20 0.6 0.5 2 15 4 III 
Table 1: R&S Data for Three Alternatives 
We see from the data that no alternative dominates another with respect to all seven R&S 
measures. For example, Alt1 has the highest (best) MTBD, INT and PER scores (it is tied with 
Alt2 with respect to the latter). Alt 1 is also ranked highest for SC. Alt2 has the lowest 
operational cost (OC), and Alt 3 has the lowest down time (MDT) and lowest maintenance cost 




Running the DEA model presented in Section 5, where we select for each alternative its 
maximum feasible value of  ,  we obtain that while the ER values for Alt1 and Alt2 are 1, that 
is, they are R&S efficient, for Alt 3 ER = 0.77, which means that the “best” coefficients it could 
find for its data still rate it 23% lower than Alt1 and Alt 2. Note that if  is set at a value smaller 
than its maximum value, the differentiating power of the model decreases, that is, for a smaller 
 all alternatives may be tied at the top. More on this differentiating effect in the next section. 
8. Summary 
This report bridges a gap in AoA, addressing the role of examining readiness and sustainment 
(R&S) in such analyses. In the first part of the report we define these characteristics and study 
their components. This study results in a set of MOEs that must be observed, and updated as new 
data becomes available, throughout the development process of a new system. In the second part 
of the report we propose an analytic procedure, grounded in the well-established methodology of 
DEA to continuously assess the R&S aspects of the AoA.  
Like all other quantitative methodologies, DEA has certain weaknesses that users must be aware 
of and be ready to address when the need arises.  We describe below two such weaknesses along 
with recommendations on ways to overcome them.   
 Differentiation power 
DEA's differentiation power increases as the ratio between the number of alternatives and 
the number of MOEs increases.  When this ratio is close to 1 (i.e., the number of 
alternatives is approximately the same as the number of MOEs), most alternatives are 
likely to be evaluated as fully efficient.  In such scenarios, it is enough, for example, that 
the value of one of its numerator MOEs is larger than the corresponding values of all 
other alternatives to be evaluated as efficient. This phenomenon was discussed in Section 
7.  In the context of R&S evaluation, this scenario is quite likely as we have 7 MOEs and 
the typical number of alternatives in an AoA study is less than 12.  To overcome this 




o Weight restrictions. The objective function of the model we presented above 
seeks to maximize the efficiency score for the alternative it evaluates.  Thus, 
adding constraints to this model will cause a decrease in the efficiency score. The 
constraints should reflect qualitative assessment by the decision makers involved 
in the process.  For example, putting some priorities on the weights (Roll, Cook, 
& Golany, 1991). 
o Adding alternatives. During the development of a certain alternative, there are 
several design and engineering options that could be explored – each generating 
another alternative.  Also, one could add "utopian" alternatives, generated 
artificially based on past experience, and use them as benchmarks.   
 Uniqueness  
Certain alternatives may be affiliated with some attribute that doesn't exist in other 
alternatives and hence it makes them unique.  A unique alternative is, by definition, fully 
efficient as we can't compare it to any other alternative.  For example, suppose we 
evaluate the procurement of platforms that would transfer combat personnel from sea to 
shore and backwards and that all but one of the alternatives are different kinds of vessels 
and only one alternative is airborne.  The contractor of the airborne alternative may claim 
that his alternative is unique to ensure it is ranked as efficient, absent competitors.   To 
avoid such claims, one should ensure that the MOEs are as general as possible but yet 
relevant and useful.  The way we presented the MOEs in this report is indeed quite 
general and we believe that in most cases it can be used as is.   
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